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NATIONWIDE PERMIT 12 AND DOMESTIC OIL
PIPELINES: AN INCOMPATIBLE RELATIONSHIP?
Alexander S. Arkfeld*
Abstract: As climate change’s momentum becomes increasingly more difficult to quell,
environmentalists are litigating to stop oil pipeline expansion. Litigation over two recently
completed oil pipelines—the Flanagan South and the Gulf Coast—illustrates the legal battle
environmentalists face. Given the outcome of those cases, it may seem that environmentalists
face insurmountable judicial precedent. But they are not out of options quite yet.
Although no statute expressly requires the federal government to conduct environmental
analysis of proposed domestic oil pipelines, two statutes—the Clean Water Act (CWA) and
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)—generally work in tandem to require the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps or Corps) to complete an analysis when a proposed
pipeline crosses regulated waters. However, the Army Corps recently has begun using a
general permit called Nationwide Permit 12 (NWP 12) to streamline the approval process by
avoiding individual review of pipelines. The Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits upheld
the Army Corps’s use of NWP 12 in approving the Flanagan South and Gulf Coast pipelines,
rejecting arguments that such use violates the CWA and NEPA. Not only did environmentalists
lose both decisions, but the Army Corps also subsequently tightened its analysis to avoid
potential future liability.
Despite these setbacks, this Note contends that the battle is not yet over. The Note argues
that the Army Corps failed to comply with the CWA’s plain meaning when it issued NWP 12,
resulting in a limited opportunity for the public to participate. By limiting public comment,
NWP 12 undermines the Corps’s ability to take a hard look at the environmental consequences
of proposed oil pipelines. If the agency cannot comply with the CWA’s plain meaning, it can
no longer use NWP 12 to avoid individual review of oil pipelines. Given recent judicial
precedent, environmentalists face a difficult task. But hope remains. Under the framework first
described in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the circuit
courts are improperly deferring to the Army Corps’s interpretation of the CWA when the
statute’s meaning is clear. Judicial recognition and correction of this would be a victory for
environmentalists, as it would increase federal environmental review of domestic oil pipelines
and provide the public with a better opportunity to voice its concerns over the proliferation of
oil pipelines in the United States.

INTRODUCTION
The U.S. is an energy glutton. Despite accounting for less than 5% of
the world’s population, the country consumes nearly 20% of the world’s
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energy supply1 and is the world’s largest consumer of oil.2 More than 2.5
million miles of oil and natural gas pipeline help satiate the high demand,3
and this number is increasing.4 As our opportunity to prevent climate
change’s most dire consequences recedes like a coastline in rising tides,5
environmentalists, in their fight against oil dependence, are fiercely
opposing construction of new pipelines.6 In the courts, environmentalists
have recently come up short.7
To provide context to the statutory and regulatory requirements
concerning federal oil pipeline review and approval,8 this Note examines
two heavily litigated domestic oil pipelines: TransCanada’s Gulf Coast
Pipeline (GC Pipeline) and Enbridge’s Flanagan South Pipeline (FS
Pipeline). The GC Pipeline transports oil nearly 500 miles from Cushing,
1. Meg Jacobs, America’s Never-Ending Oil Consumption, ATLANTIC (May 15, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/american-oil-consumption/482532/
[http://perma.cc/YNH7-ME6G]; see also What Is the United States’ Share of World Energy
Consumption?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=87&t=1
[https://perma.cc/Z8HL-N7PP] (the United States’s share of world energy consumption is 18%).
2. Alex Kuzoian, Animated Map Shows All the Major Oil and Gas Pipelines in the U.S., BUS.
INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2015, 6:39 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/map-major-us-oil-gas-energypipelines-2015-12 [http://perma.cc/C5NC-3ZCR].
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Trump Seeks to Revive Dakota Access, Keystone XL
Oil Pipelines, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/01/24/trump-gives-green-light-to-dakota-access-keystone-xl-oil-pipelines/
?utm_term=.aa1f812e443c [http://perma.cc/4CS3-NHZL] (reporting on President Trump’s executive
orders supporting the completion of the Dakota Access and Keystone XL oil pipelines).
5. See generally Christiana Figueres et al., Three Years to Safeguard Our Climate, 546 NATURE
593 (2017) (providing evidence that global leadership must make significant strides by 2020 to
effectively combat climate change).
6. See, e.g., Andrew M. Harris & Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Keystone XL Pipeline Block Sought to Undo
Trump’s Approval, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2017, 10:13 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-03-30/keystone-xl-pipeline-comes-under-new-challenges-over-approval
[http://perma.cc/L4AQ-EZZK] (reporting on environmental groups’ challenge to President Trump’s
approval of the Keystone XL pipeline).
7. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick (Bostick II), 787 F.3d 1043, 1061 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting
environmentalists’ challenges to the Gulf Coast Pipeline).
8. This Note focuses on domestic oil pipelines rather than transnational oil pipelines or natural gas
pipelines. The federal approval process for domestic oil pipelines is less stringent than the approval
process for natural gas pipelines. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission must approve proposed
natural gas pipelines, Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Army Corps II), 803 F.3d 31,
50 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2015), subjecting the entire pipeline to environmental review, Del. Riverkeeper
Network v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 753 F.3d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Domestic oil
pipelines, on the other hand, do not require comparable federal approval and are thus not expressly
subject to whole-pipeline review. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 50. Domestic oil pipelines also differ
from transnational oil pipelines in that the Secretary of State must approve transnational pipelines.
See id. at 33 (“The U.S. Secretary of State must approve oil pipelines that cross international
borders . . . but that requirement is inapplicable to wholly domestic pipelines.”).
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Oklahoma, to the Gulf Coast,9 crossing over 2000 regulated waters10 along
its route.11 The nearly 600-mile-long FS Pipeline is designed to ship
approximately 600,000 barrels of oil per day from Illinois to Cushing,
Oklahoma, where the oil is then directed to the Gulf Coast.12 It, too,
crosses roughly 2000 regulated waters.13
Although no specific statute expressly subjects domestic oil pipelines
to whole-pipeline review and approval, two statutes create a regulatory
scheme that generally serves to subject entire pipelines crossing regulated
waters to review and approval.14 The Clean Water Act15 (CWA) requires
the federal government to issue a permit for each segment of pipeline that
crosses regulated waters.16 This, in turn, triggers the National
Environmental Policy Act of 196917 (NEPA), a federal statute that
subjects federally issued permits to environmental review.18 An important
aspect of environmental review under NEPA is its public-comment
mandate, which serves to assist the federal government in making
informed decisions.19 Environmental review of CWA permits is not
limited to the permit itself but must also include the permit’s foreseeable
effects—the completion of an oil pipeline, for example.20 However, the
Army Corps has evaded individualized environmental review by using
Nationwide Permit 12 (NWP 12)—a type of CWA permit that approves
all projects falling within its scope—as a tool to approve domestic oil
pipelines.21 The Tenth and District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuits upheld
this use of NWP 12 despite CWA and NEPA challenges brought by
environmental groups.22

9. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick (Bostick I), 539 F. App’x 885, 887 (10th Cir. 2013).
10. The Army Corps has jurisdiction over “all waters of the United States.” Ohio Valley Envtl.
Coal. v. Bulen (Ohio Valley I), 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 454–55 (S.D.W. Va. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated
in part, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005). This Note refers to waters within the Corps’s jurisdiction as
“regulated waters.”
11. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1046.
12. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 35.
13. Id. at 33–34, 52.
14. See, e.g., id. at 33 (“[n]otwithstanding the absence of any general permitting requirement for
domestic oil pipelines,” the Clean Water Act often triggers environmental review under NEPA).
15. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
16. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 38.
17. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(h) (2012).
18. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 36.
19. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768–69 (2004).
20. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2016) (defining “cumulative impact” under NEPA as the “incremental
impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions”).
21. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 38–40; Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1049–50 (10th Cir. 2015).
22. See Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 34–35; Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1061.
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Part I of this Note introduces the CWA and NEPA, explaining how the
two statutes can work in tandem to provide a regulatory scheme over oil
pipelines where none might otherwise exist. It also explains the concept
of general permitting. Part II first introduces NWP 12—a general permit
designed to cover utility lines impacting less than a half-acre of regulated
waters at each “separate and distant crossing.” The term “utility lines”
encompasses oil pipelines. Part II also introduces the GC and FS
pipelines. Part III discusses the recent litigation over the GC Pipeline in
the Tenth Circuit and the FS Pipeline in the D.C. Circuit. Both Circuits
upheld the Corps’s use of NWP 12 to approve pipelines.
Part IV argues that despite these rulings, the current use of NWP 12 in
approving domestic oil pipelines violates the CWA’s plain meaning. The
CWA requires the Army Corps to ensure that a general permit will have
minimal cumulative adverse effects on the environment before issuing the
permit, and the Army Corps failed to comply with this plain meaning
when it reissued NWP 12. If the agency cannot comply with the CWA’s
plain meaning, then it cannot use NWP 12 to avoid individual review of
oil pipelines. However, under the framework first described in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,23 courts are
improperly deferring to the Army Corps’s interpretation of the CWA
when the statute’s meaning is clear. 24 As a result, the Army Corps is able
to evade hard-look review of domestic oil pipelines. In Part V, this Note
concludes that although the Corps conducted more detailed NEPA
analysis when reissuing NWP 12 in 2017, the general permit is still out of
compliance with the CWA and is thus subject to meritorious legal
challenges.
I.

THE CWA AND NEPA COMBINE TO SUBJECT DOMESTIC
OIL PIPELINES CROSSING REGULATED WATERS TO
WHOLE-PIPELINE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW

While no statute requires an oil company to obtain a federal permit
before constructing a domestic oil pipeline, if that pipeline crosses “waters
of the United States,” the CWA requires the company to obtain a permit.25
The need for a CWA permit triggers independent environmental review
requirements under NEPA, which requires the federal government to
analyze the probable environmental impact of major federal actions.26
23.
24.
25.
26.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 843–44.
Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 38–40.
Id. at 36 (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756–57 (2004)). Additionally,
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Understanding how the two statutory schemes work in tandem requires a
basic understanding of both.
A.

The Clean Water Act

The CWA’s objective “is to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”27 The Act sets
out to accomplish this objective “by prohibiting the discharge of any
pollutant, including dredged or fill material,” into regulated waters.28 This
prohibition is not without exception. For example, the Army Corps may
issue section 404 permits, which allow discharge of dredged or fill
material into regulated waters.29 The Corps may issue an individual permit
for a single proposed project, or it may issue a general permit with the
potential to cover multiple not-yet-proposed projects.30 General permits
are issued for up to five years on a state, regional, or nationwide basis,31
and they may be reissued upon expiration.32
The CWA allows the Corps to issue general permits—and avoid
individual permitting—under limited circumstances. The Corps may issue
a general permit only if the permitted activities (1) “are similar in nature,”
(2) “will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when
performed separately,” and (3) “will have only minimal cumulative
adverse effect on the environment.”33 These three requirements are
substantive limitations: the Corps may not issue a general permit if any of

the Bureau of Indian Affairs regulates “the granting of easements over Indian land,” and “all federal
agencies must consult with the [Fish and Wildlife Service] to ensure that ‘any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency’ is unlikely” to adversely affect endangered or threatened
species or their habitat. Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Army Corps I), 990 F. Supp.
2d 9, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2013). These federal schemes are not discussed in this Note.
27. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
28. Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 19.
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). These permits are often referred to as section 404 permits because what
is now codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) was originally enacted in section 404 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More than
Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the
Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 527, 548 (2005). Meanwhile, the EPA issues permits for the
“discharge of any pollutant.” 33 U.S.C. § 1342; see also Murchison, supra, at 538 n.83. The difference
between a “pollutant” and “dredged or fill material” is not always clear. See generally Kory R.
Watson, Fill Material Pollution Under the Clean Water Act: A Need for Legislative Change, 35 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 335 (2011).
30. See Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e).
32. Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e).
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the three are not met.34 Put another way, the Corps may not issue a general
permit if the permit would authorize dissimilar projects or result in more
than minimal adverse environmental effects on either an individual or
cumulative basis.35
The Corps did not always have the option to issue a general permit.
Originally, the CWA only permitted the Corps to issue individual, or
section 404(a), permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material.36 The
Corps viewed the lack of general permitting as an inconvenience37
because individual permitting requires extensive, case-by-case review for
each qualifying project.38 Moreover, in 1975, a district court held that the
Corps’s CWA jurisdiction was quite broad.39 In Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway,40 the court ordered the Corps to
“[p]ublish . . . regulations clearly recognizing the full regulatory mandate
of the [CWA],” which, the court found, extended to all the nation’s waters
“to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause.”41
Because the Army Corps issues discharge permits,42 the broader its
jurisdiction, the more permit applications it must consider. Thus, the
Corps opposed this broad interpretation of its jurisdiction, expressing
concern that the decision would require it to issue individual permits to
“the rancher who wants to enlarge his stock pond, or the farmer who wants
to deepen an irrigation ditch or plow a field, or the mountaineer who wants
to protect his land against stream erosion.”43
Although Congress would affirm the Corps’s jurisdiction over “all
34. Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1254 (D. Wyo.
2005) (“Unlike NEPA, which imposes only procedural requirements, the CWA imposes ‘substantive
restrictions on agency action.’” (quoting Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1273–
74 (10th Cir. 2004))).
35. Id.
36. See Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 453–55 (S.D.W. Va. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated in
part, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005).
37. Michael Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water
Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L.
REV. 695, 705 n.56 (1989) (quoting Dep’t of Army, Office of Chief of Engineers, Press Release (May
6, 1975)).
38. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 2013). “Individual permitting under Section
404(a) . . . involves site-specific documentation and analysis, public interest review, and formal
determination.” Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
39. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
40. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
41. Id. at 686.
42. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
43. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 37, at 705 n.56 (quoting Dep’t of Army, Office of Chief of
Engineers, Press Release (May 6, 1975)).
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waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act of 1977, it did seek
to alleviate some of the Corps’s concerns through the addition of section
404(e), which permits the Corps to issue general permits.44 General
permits are a less burdensome alternative to individual permitting;45 once
issued, activities falling within the scope of a general permit ordinarily
may proceed with “little, if any, delay or paperwork.”46 However, per
Army Corps regulations, the terms and conditions of some general permits
require permittees to file pre-construction notice with the Corps.47 For
example, NWP 12, discussed in detail infra, requires a permittee to file
pre-construction notice and seek Corps verification in seven situations,
such as when “the utility line in waters of the United States . . . exceeds
500 feet.”48 In such cases, the agency must verify, among other things,
that the proposed project will cause only minimal environmental
impacts.49 The Corps may supplement a general permit with projectspecific conditions “[t]o ensure that the activity complies with the terms
and conditions of the NWP and that the adverse impacts on the aquatic
environment and other aspects of the public interest are individually and
cumulatively minimal.”50 In other words, while the CWA gives the Corps
the ability to supplement its analysis with project-specific conditions, it
does not require the Corps to do so. If the agency determines that a project
cannot meet a general permit’s requirements, it will demand that the
project proponent obtain an individual, rather than a general, permit.51
It may help to view the general permitting process as two stages. First,
at the issuance stage, the Army Corps issues a general permit for similar
projects that will result in minimal impacts on both an individual and
cumulative basis. Second, if a general permit requires pre-construction
notice, the Corps verifies that a now-specified project falls within the
general permit’s scope and may add conditions to ensure minimal
impacts. This Note refers to the second stage as the verification stage.
Once the Corps verifies that a project satisfies the previously issued

44. Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 454–55.
45. See id. at 467.
46. 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(b)–(c) (2016); Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2013). “After
determining that a discrete category of activities will have minimal adverse effects on the
environment, the Corps need not individually review projects that fit into that category.” Ohio Valley
I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
47. 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(d); see also Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
48. Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,272 (Feb. 21, 2012).
49. See Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
50. 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(e)(2); see also Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 39.
51. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 39.
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NWP’s requirements, a party may complete its project.
B.

The National Environmental Policy Act

“NEPA requires the federal government to identify and assess in
advance the likely environmental impact of its proposed actions, including
its authorization or permitting of private actions.”52 At the statute’s heart
is the requirement for publicly available environmental review of
“proposed ‘major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.’”53 The Army Corps must engage in NEPA analysis
prior to granting an individual CWA permit and before issuing or
reissuing a general CWA permit, both of which are major federal
actions.54
NEPA prohibits uninformed federal agency action55 by “ensuring that
(1) agency decisions include informed and careful consideration of
environmental impact, and (2) agencies inform the public of that impact
and enable interested persons to participate in deciding what projects
agencies should approve and under what terms.”56 To accomplish these
twin aims, a federal agency must conduct an environmental analysis and
must make that analysis available for public comment.57 Public comment
ensures “that the larger audience . . . can provide input as necessary to the
agency making the relevant decisions.”58 Ultimately, public comment
assists the federal government in making informed decisions.59
The Council on Environmental Quality—an executive body that
interprets NEPA and establishes NEPA regulations60—details the
required scope of an agency’s analysis.61 Among other requirements,
agencies must analyze “cumulative actions,” or actions that, when viewed
with other proposed actions, “have cumulatively significant impacts and
52. Id. at 36 (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756–57 (2004)).
53. Id. at 37 (quoting National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012)). If
an agency has discretion in approving a project, it must conduct environmental analysis under NEPA.
Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. Surface Transp. Bd., 267 F.3d 1144, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The
touchstone of whether NEPA applies is discretion.”).
54. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2013). Whether the Army Corps must
engage in NEPA review at the verification stage is an issue discussed infra.
55. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989).
56. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 36–37 (citing Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 768).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 4332; see also Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
58. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 768–69 (internal quotations omitted).
59. See id.
60. Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1063 (10th Cir. 2015) (McHugh, J., concurring).
61. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (2016).
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should therefore be discussed in the same impact statement.”62
Cumulative impacts, or cumulative effects,63 result “from the incremental
impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or nonFederal) or person undertakes such other actions.”64
Unlike the CWA’s substantive limitations for general permitting,65
courts have interpreted NEPA to be solely procedural.66 NEPA merely
requires “federal agencies to take a ‘hard look’ at their proposed actions’
environmental consequences in advance of deciding whether and how to
proceed.”67 The statute does not mandate that an agency make its decision
based on its environmental analysis; it “merely prohibits uninformed—
rather than unwise—agency action.”68 An agency can only make an
informed decision after careful consideration of the potential
environmental impact and the public’s comments.69
C.

The CWA and NEPA: Intertwined Statutes with Separate
Requirements

The relationship between the CWA and NEPA, along with the
similarity in the language of the two statutes, can lead to confusion.70 The
Army Corps must comply with NEPA before issuing an individual or
general permit under section 404 of the CWA.71 The CWA requires the
Corps to ensure that a nationwide permit will result in, among other

62. Id.
63. Effects and impacts as used in the CEQ regulations are synonymous. Id. § 1508.8. Thus,
cumulative effects and cumulative impacts are the same thing and may result from cumulative actions.
See Alpine Lakes Protection Soc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 838 F. Supp. 478, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1993)
(explaining that cumulative actions are actions that have cumulative impacts, or cumulative effects,
and should therefore be considered together).
64. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35. The CWA “imposes ‘substantive restrictions on
agency action.’” Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1254
(D. Wyo. 2005) (quoting Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1273–74 (10th Cir.
2004)). “[T]he CWA is clear that when the effect of a general permit will be more than minimal,
either individually or cumulatively, the Corps cannot issue the permit.” Id.
66. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2013).
67. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350–51 (1989)).
68. Id. (quoting Methow Valley, 490 U.S. at 351).
69. See id. at 36–37 (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004)).
70. See, e.g., Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1062–63 (10th Cir. 2015) (McHugh, J., concurring)
(explaining that the Army Corps conflated its NEPA obligations with its CWA obligations).
71. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 26–27.
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things, “only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.”72
Meanwhile, NEPA regulations require the Corps “to consider all of the
reasonably foreseeable . . . cumulative effects of [its] action.”73
Accordingly, both statutes require some form of a cumulative-effects
analysis.
One major difference between the two analyses is that while the NEPA
analysis is merely procedural,74 the CWA analysis is substantive.75 The
Corps will satisfy NEPA so long as it properly analyzes all reasonably
foreseeable cumulative effects of its permitting action—NEPA does not
require the Corps to choose the least impactful option.76 However, the
Corps’s burden is greater under the CWA; it may not issue a general
permit unless future projects within the permit’s scope will result in
minimal cumulative adverse effects.77
The CWA and NEPA also differ on the scope of the required review.
While CWA analysis is limited to the aquatic environment,78 NEPA
analysis is broader, encompassing the aquatic and non-aquatic
environments.79 In Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick,80 Judge McHugh—
addressing a challenge to the GC Pipeline—described what she saw as the
Army Corps conflating its obligations under NEPA with its obligations
under the CWA.81 Specifically, she expressed concern over the Corps
limiting its NEPA analysis to a project’s impact on regulated waters.82 She
explained that the regulations guiding the Corps’s general-permitting
process specify that its CWA analysis is limited to an activity’s effect on
the aquatic environment and therefore “may be properly limited to the
aquatic impacts associated with the discharge of dredge and fill
material.”83 However, Judge McHugh further explained that the scope of
its NEPA analysis is broader than its CWA analysis, extending beyond

72. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2012).
73. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1063 (McHugh, J., concurring); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7, 1508.25
(2016).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 65–69.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 65–69.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35.
78. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1063 (McHugh, J., concurring).
79. See id.
80. 787 F.3d 1043 (10th Cir. 2015).
81. Id. at 1062–63 (McHugh, J., concurring).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1063 (emphasis added).
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the aquatic environment.84
Other courts have “universally adopted” Judge McHugh’s
understanding of the Corps’s NEPA obligations.85 For example, in
Wyoming Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,86 the court
held that the Corps may not limit its NEPA analysis to regulated waters.87
In Hillsdale Environmental Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers,88 the Tenth Circuit upheld the Corps’s decision to issue a
CWA permit for the construction of a project because the Corps did not
limit its NEPA analysis to the aquatic environment.89 The court observed
that the Corps’s NEPA analysis “considered both [the] direct and
reasonably foreseeable indirect impacts to land use, air quality, noise,
traffic, water quality, threatened and endangered species, and cultural
resources.”90 In Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers,91 the Ninth Circuit
upheld a preliminary injunction halting development of a gated
community because the Corps only analyzed the project’s impact on
regulated waters.92 The court highlighted the distinction between the
Corps’s CWA analysis and its NEPA analysis:
Although the Corps’[s] permitting authority is limited to those
aspects of a development that directly affect jurisdictional waters,
it has responsibility under NEPA to analyze all of the
environmental consequences of a project. Put another way, while
it is the development’s impact on jurisdictional waters that
determines the scope of the Corps’[s] permitting authority, it is
the impact of the permit on the environment at large that
determines the Corps’[s] NEPA responsibility. The Corps’[s]
responsibility under NEPA to consider the environmental
consequences of a permit extends even to environmental effects
with no impact on jurisdictional waters at all.93
Thus, before issuing or reissuing a general permit, the Corps must

84. Id.
85. Id. at 1064–65 (citing seven cases in support).
86. 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Wyo. 2005).
87. Id. at 1240–43.
88. 702 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2012).
89. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1063–64 (McHugh, J., concurring) (citing Hillsdale Envtl. Loss
Prevention, Inc., 702 F.3d at 1162–64, 1172–77).
90. Id. (quoting Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc., 702 F.3d at 1162–64, 1164 (internal
quotations omitted)).
91. 408 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005).
92. Id. at 1117–18.
93. Id. at 1122 (emphasis added).
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satisfy two separate but related requirements that turn on a proper analysis
of cumulative effects.94 Under NEPA, the Corps must complete an
analysis of all reasonably foreseeable cumulative effects of the permit,
and it may not limit this analysis to the aquatic environment.95 If it
properly accounts for the foreseeable effects, the Corps will satisfy
NEPA’s requirement of informed agency action—regardless of whether
the cumulative effects are more than minimal.96 Under the CWA, the
Corps must ensure that all future projects within the general permit’s
scope will have only a minimal cumulative adverse effect on the aquatic
environment.97 If the agency cannot show that the future projects’
cumulative adverse effect on regulated waters will be minimal, it may not
issue the general permit and must individually permit the projects.98 The
CWA, in other words, prohibits the Army Corps from issuing general,
nationwide permits that will more than minimally impact the aquatic
environment.
II.

NATIONWIDE PERMIT 12, THE GULF COAST PIPELINE,
AND THE FLANAGAN SOUTH PIPELINE

The Army Corps has issued and reissued the CWA general permit
known as NWP 12 for decades.99 The Corps may issue a general permit
only if the permitted activities (1) “are similar in nature,” (2) “will cause
only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately,”
and (3) “will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the
environment.”100 Reissued every five years,101 the 2012 version of NWP
12 was at the heart of the recent litigation over the GC and FS pipelines,
both of which relied extensively on NWP 12—rather than individual
permits—to receive federal approval.102
The Corps may use NWP 12 to approve activities falling within the
94. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1063 (McHugh, J., concurring).
95. See id.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 65–69.
97. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1063 (McHugh, J., concurring).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35.
99. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1068 (McHugh, J., concurring).
100. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2012).
101. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 2013) (“A general permit is valid for five
years, and can be reissued for subsequent five-year periods.”).
102. See Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 38–40 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1051–55.
The 2012 version of NWP 12, which existed from March 19, 2012 to March 19, 2017, was used to
approve the GC and FS pipelines. See Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,184
(Feb. 21, 2012).
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general permit’s scope,103 and the Corps defines NWP 12’s scope broadly.
Specifically, the general permit authorizes “the construction,
maintenance, repair, and removal of utility lines and associated facilities
in waters of the United States, provided the activity does not result in the
loss of greater than [half]-acre of waters of the United States for each
single and complete project.”104 The definition of “utility lines” includes
“any pipe or pipeline for the transportation of any gaseous, liquid,
liquescent, or slurry substance, for any purpose.”105 For linear utility-line
projects, such as oil pipelines, the Corps considers “each crossing of a
water body at a separate and distant location” to be a “single and complete
project.”106 Stated otherwise, depending on the number of water crossings,
the Corps may consider one oil pipeline to consist of many separate
projects, rather than viewing the pipeline itself as one project. In sum, to
comply with NWP 12, the construction of an oil pipeline may not result
in the loss of more than a half-acre of regulated water at any of the
pipeline’s “separate and distant” regulated-water crossings.107
Although the Army Corps conducted CWA and NEPA108 analyses
when it reissued NWP 12 in 2012 (the issuance stage),109 the agency left
open the possibility of additional environmental review at the verification
stage.110 The general permit requires a permittee to file pre-construction
notice and seek Corps verification in seven situations, including when
“the utility line in waters of the United States . . . exceeds 500 feet” and

103. Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 20, 26; 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(b)–(c) (2016).
104. Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. at 10,271.
105. Id.
106. Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 21 (citing Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg.
at 10,290). A “linear project” is “a project constructed for the purpose of getting people, goods, or
services from a point of origin to a terminal point, which often involves multiple crossing of one or
more waterbodies at separate and distant locations.” Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg.
at 10,195. “Roads and pipelines are examples of linear projects.” Id. at 10,263.
For linear projects crossing a single or multiple waterbodies several times at separate and distant
locations, each crossing is considered a single and complete project for purposes of NWP
authorization. However, individual channels in a braided stream or river, or individual arms of a
large, irregularly shaped wetland or lake, etc., are not separate waterbodies, and crossings of
such features cannot be considered separately.
Id. at 10,290.
107. Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 21 (citing Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg.
at 10,290).
108. The NEPA analysis resulted in a finding of no significant impact. Reissuance of Nationwide
Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. at 10,269.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 10,196–97 (“[P]re-construction notification thresholds are necessary . . . to allow district
engineers the opportunity to review those activities to determine whether they will result in minimal
adverse effects on the aquatic environment.”).
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when “discharges . . . result in the loss of greater than 1/10-acre of
[regulated waters].”111
Despite being reissued for decades, oil companies historically did not
use NWP 12 to approve major oil pipelines.112 However, the GC and FS
pipelines changed everything. TransCanada Corporation’s 485-mile113
GC Pipeline, which transports oil from Oklahoma to the Gulf Coast,114
relied on the permit for each of its 2,227 separate and distant water
crossings.115 The FS Pipeline, which carries oil 593 miles from Illinois to
Oklahoma,116 relied on the same permit 1,950 times.117 The GC and FS
pipelines thus provided a novel situation. Rather than individually
permitting each pipeline—which, since the pipelines cross regulated
waters, would have required environmental review of the entire projects—
the Army Corps used NWP 12 to approve each of the pipelines’ separate
and distant crossings. Put bluntly, this use of NWP 12 allowed the Corps
to evade whole-pipeline review.
III. THE TENTH AND D.C. CIRCUITS REJECT CHALLENGES TO
THE ARMY CORPS’S USE OF NWP 12 TO APPROVE OIL
PIPELINES.
In January 2014,118 the GC Pipeline began transporting oil from
Oklahoma to the Gulf Coast.119 Prior to this, three groups, including the
111. 77 Fed. Reg. at 10,272 (requiring pre-construction notice in the following situations: “(1) [t]he
activity involves mechanized land clearing in a forested wetland for the utility line right-of-way; (2)
a section 10 permit is required; (3) the utility line in waters of the United States, excluding overhead
lines, exceeds 500 feet; (4) the utility line is placed within a jurisdictional area (i.e., water of the
United States), and it runs parallel to or along a stream bed that is within that jurisdictional area; (5)
discharges that result in the loss of greater than 1⁄10-acre of waters of the United States; (6) permanent
access roads are constructed above grade in waters of the United States for a distance of more than
500 feet; or (7) permanent access roads are constructed in waters of the United States with impervious
materials”).
112. See Sierra Club et al., Comment Letter on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Proposal to
Reissue and Modify Nationwide Permit 12, No. COE-2015-0017, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2016),
https://www.nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/Global-Warming/Tar-Sands/NWP-12-Comments_FINAL_
080116.ashx [http://perma.cc/L6LG-LL84] [hereinafter NWP 12: Public Comments].
113. Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1046 (10th Cir. 2015).
114. Bostick I, 539 F. App’x 885, 887 (10th Cir. 2013).
115. Id. at 901 (Martínez, J., dissenting).
116. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
117. Id. at 38.
118. Bill Chappell, Keystone Pipeline’s Southern Section Begins Delivering Oil to Gulf Coast, NPR
(Jan. 22, 2014, 9:05 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/I-way/2014/01/22/265076621/keystonepipeline-s-southern-section-begins-delivering-oil-to-gulf-coast [http://perma.cc/MB5Y-KMEQ].
119. Bostick I, 539 F. App’x at 887.
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Sierra Club, sued the federal government, challenging the Army Corps’s
NEPA analysis of NWP 12 at both the issuance and verification stage.120
The environmental groups also challenged the Army Corps’s use of NWP
12 to approve the pipeline, arguing that the Corps failed to ensure minimal
cumulative adverse effects.121 In Sierra Club, Inc. v. Bostick, the Tenth
Circuit ruled in favor of the federal government.122
The FS Pipeline carries oil 593 miles from Illinois to Oklahoma.123 The
Sierra Club sued the federal government as soon as Enbridge Pipelines
began constructing the oil pipeline in 2013.124 The Sierra Club made
several arguments, attacking the government’s failure “to analyze and
invite public comment on the environmental impact of the whole pipeline
under NEPA” and criticizing the Army Corps’s use of NWP 12 in the
approval process.125 In Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers,126 the D.C. Circuit rejected the Sierra Club’s arguments,
approving the Army Corps’s use of NWP 12 and holding “that the federal
government was not required to conduct NEPA analysis of the entirety of
the Flanagan South [P]ipeline.”127
Environmental groups focused their litigation on the CWA and NEPA.
The two statutes require the Army Corps to complete separate but related
analyses before reissuing NWP 12.128 However, the Corps argued that it
was too difficult to complete its analysis before, for example, oil
companies proposed a specific oil pipeline.129 The agency contended that
the difficulty arose because of the scope of nationwide permits, which
entities may use to “authorize activities across the nation . . . in a wide
variety of environmental settings.”130 The Army Corps further argued that
this difficulty allowed it to push some of its analysis to the verification
stage—as opposed to the issuance stage when most environmental

120. See id. at 887–88.
121. Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1046–47 (10th Cir. 2015).
122. Id. at 1047.
123. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
124. Id. at 34.
125. Id.
126. 803 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
127. Id. at 34.
128. See supra section I.C.
129. See, e.g., Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1058 (10th Cir. 2015) (outlining the Army Corps’s
argument).
130. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 528, Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043 (No. 146099)).
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analysis traditionally occurs.131 In fact, for both the GC and FS pipelines,
the Corps only considered the cumulative impact of each pipeline’s stream
crossings in a single review at the verification stage,132 if at all.133 By that
point, the public had no remaining opportunity to comment.134
A major issue, then, is whether the law permits the Army Corps to defer
any of its NEPA or CWA analysis, and if it does, which parts it may
legally defer. The Tenth Circuit held that the Corps may partially defer its
CWA analysis to the verification stage.135 The Tenth and D.C. Circuits
held that no NEPA analysis is required at the verification stage.136 Judge
McHugh’s concurrence in the Tenth Circuit went a step further, arguing
that the Army Corps may not conduct additional NEPA review at the
verification stage; instead, the Corps must complete all NEPA review at
the issuance stage.137
A second issue is whether the Army Corps’s CWA and NEPA analyses
sufficiently scrutinized NWP 12’s cumulative effects, regardless of
whether the analyses occurred at the issuance or verification stage.138 The
Tenth and D.C. Circuits in the GC and FS pipeline litigation upheld the
CWA analysis.139 However, both Circuits strongly questioned the
sufficiency of the NEPA analysis but did not rule either way because the
issue was not properly before them.140

131. See id. at 1058–60.
132. See id. at 1061 (noting that “the record shows that district engineers analyzed the cumulative
impacts of the proposed crossings” at the verification stage).
133. See Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 33–34, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that NWP 12 permits the
Corps to evaluate cumulative effects on a regional basis, suggesting that all the crossings were never
analyzed together).
134. Cf. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1060 (arguing that “partial deferral would not restrict the public’s
ability to comment on proposed permits” because the public has an opportunity to comment at the
issuance stage); see also infra section IV.B.
135. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1051, 1056.
136. Id. at 1052–54; Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2013).
137. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1067 (McHugh, J., concurring).
138. See, e.g., id. at 1060–61 (majority opinion) (rejecting arguments that the Army Corps’s
analysis was deficient).
139. Id.; see also Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 52–53 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
140. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 40 n.3 (“To the extent that the Corps . . . understood its NEPA
obligations as confined to considering environmental effects on CWA jurisdictional waters, its view
misapprehends the obligations of any agency taking action subject to NEPA to do a comprehensive
analysis of all types of foreseeable environmental effects.”); Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1051 n.8 (“In her
thoughtful concurrence, Judge McHugh concludes that it would have been obvious to the Corps that
its analysis of cumulative effects was too restrictive. In our view, however, the environmental groups
did not invoke the obviousness exception on the NEPA claims involving cumulative effects.”).
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Courts Allow the Army Corps to Partially Defer Its CWA Analysis
to the Verification Stage, but They Do Not Require Additional
NEPA Review at that Stage

Courts have allowed the Army Corps to defer a portion of its CWA
analysis to the verification stage.141 In such cases, courts do not require
the Corps to supplement its deferred analysis with additional NEPA
review.142 This limits the public’s ability to comment on proposed
projects.143 Relatedly, it limits the agency’s ability to fully analyze the
cumulative environmental impacts of projects falling within NWP 12’s
scope.144
1.

Courts Allow the Corps to Partially Defer Its CWA Analysis

The CWA allows the Corps to issue a general permit only if the
permitted activities “will cause only minimal adverse environmental
effects when performed separately,” and “will have only minimal
cumulative adverse effect on the environment.”145 Per Army Corps
regulations, some general permits require the Army Corps to verify that
an individual project falls within the permit’s scope.146 Environmental
groups have sued the Army Corps for conducting CWA review while
verifying a project, as they believe the CWA requires the agency to
complete all review at the issuance stage.147
In the GC Pipeline litigation, the Tenth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that the Army Corps violated the CWA because it improperly
deferred a portion of its required environmental analysis to the verification
stage.148 In so holding, the court employed the two-step Chevron test.149
Under the test, first laid out in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., a court first looks to see if Congress directly spoke

141. See infra section III.A.1.
142. See, e.g., Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1052–54; Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 26–27 (D.D.C.
2013).
143. See Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 468 (S.D.W. Va. 2004) (“NWP 21 eliminates public
involvement in decision-making at a stage where meaningful input in the minimal impact
determination is possible.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005).
144. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1067 (McHugh, J., concurring).
145. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2012).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51.
147. See, e.g., Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1051, 1056 (rejecting arguments that the Army Corps may
not partially defer its analysis).
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)).
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on the issue.150 To do so, courts “employ[] traditional tools of statutory
construction.”151 “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”152
If the intent of Congress is not clear, the court determines whether the
agency’s interpretation of the law is acceptable, and if it is, the court will
defer to the agency.153 Because the Tenth Circuit in Bostick found that
Congress had not directly answered whether the Corps may defer the
cumulative effects analysis under the CWA, it proceeded to step two of
the Chevron test.154 The court ultimately concluded that the Army Corps
permissibly interpreted the CWA as allowing the agency to defer its
analysis.155 A decade earlier, a federal district court in West Virginia had
held that the Army Corps’s interpretation was unacceptable, only to be
overruled by the Fourth Circuit the following year.156 Understanding this
prior litigation is key to understanding the Tenth Circuit’s decision in the
GC Pipeline litigation, as well as the broader debate.
a.

Nationwide Permit 21 and the Origins of CWA Deferral

The West Virginia case, Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v.
Bulen,157 involved Nationwide Permit 21 (NWP 21), a permit comparable
to NWP 12.158 Like NWP 12, the version of NWP 21 at issue in Ohio
Valley required pre-construction notice159 and Army Corps verification.160

150. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1056 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44).
151. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
152. Id. at 842–43.
153. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1056–57 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44).
154. Id. at 1057.
155. Id. at 1057–60.
156. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen (Ohio Valley II), 429 F.3d 493, 501 (4th Cir. 2005).
157. 410 F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D.W. Va. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir.
2005).
158. NWP 21 authorizes discharges “associated with surface coal mining and reclamation
operations . . . .” Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (citing Issuance of Nationwide Permits; Notice,
67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2081 (Jan. 15, 2002)).
159. Compare Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,272 (Feb. 21, 2012)
(NWP 12 requires pre-construction notification in seven situations), with Issuance of Nationwide
Permits; Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. at 2090 (NWP 21 requires pre-construction notification).
160. Compare Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (in situations requiring preconstruction notice, the Corps must verify that the activity satisfies NWP 12’s conditions), with Ohio
Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (“The Corps must approve all NWP 21 projects before they can
proceed to construction.”).
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Unlike the Tenth Circuit in the GC Pipeline litigation,161 the district court
in Ohio Valley found, under step one of Chevron, that “the [CWA]
unambiguously requires determination of minimal impact before, not
after, the issuance of a nation wide permit.”162 The court held that “[i]f the
Corps cannot define a category of activities that will have minimal effects,
absent individual review of each activity, the activities are inappropriate
for general permitting.”163 Thus, according to the district court, deferral is
improper:
The issuance of a nationwide permit . . . functions as a guarantee
ab initio that every instance of the permitted activity will meet the
minimal impact standard. Congress intended for a potential
discharger whose project fits into one of those categories to begin
discharging with no further involvement from the Corps, no
uncertainty, and no red tape.164
The court supported its reading of the statute with legislative history,165
including the following exchange between Senator Nunn and Senator
Muskie, the co-sponsor of the 1972 Clean Water Act and floor manager
of the Clean Water Act of 1977.166 Given Senator Muskie’s role, the
Fourth Circuit has given his comments “significant weight . . . in
construing the Clean Water Act.”167
Senator Nunn: I believe that general permits for dredge and fill
activities can help eliminate lengthy delay and administrative redtape. However, it is important that such general permits be drafted
in a reasonable manner so as not to negate their usefulness. For
example, the [C]orps’[s] proposed general permit for mining in
Georgia contains a requirement that even though an activity is
generally permitted, a person wishing to conduct such permitted
activity must still give the [C]orps notice 45 days in advance of
conducting the activity. The [C]orps then would have an
unlimited time to approve or disapprove the activity. Thus, the
[C]orps in essence is requiring activities to be individually
permitted even though it purports to generally permit the
activities . . . .
161. Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1060 (10th Cir. 2015).
162. See Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
163. Id. at 467.
164. Id. at 465–66 (emphasis omitted).
165. The Supreme Court itself looked to legislative history in its original Chevron analysis. 467
U.S. 837, 862–64 (1984).
166. Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 468–69.
167. Id. at 469 (quoting Champion Int’l Corp. v. EPA, 850 F.2d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 1988)).
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For general permits to be meaningful, it seems to me that once a
general permit is obtained, it should authorize activities generally
without separate approval being required before undertaking each
such permitted activity. Am I correct that the general permits
contemplated here are intended to grant permission to conduct
activities without such separate approval from the [C]orps or a
State each time that activity is to be conducted, or without any
more than reasonable notice?
Senator Muskie: Yes; the Senator is correct.168
Additionally, the Ohio Valley district court looked to comments made
by Representative Ray Roberts, the chairman of the House committee
responsible for the passage of the Clean Water Act of 1977.169
Representative Roberts, on the day the Clean Water Act of 1977 passed
the House,170 stated:
While requiring some degree of notification of the proposed
activity to the [C]orps may be reasonable, it would be
unreasonable to require that the activity not be commenced until
the [C]orps grants its consent. This would defeat the purpose of
general permits which is to avoid individual applications and
review.171
The court found Senator Muskie’s and Representative Robert’s comments
indicative of Congress’s express intent: “nationwide permits under
Section 404(e) require a final determination of minimal environmental
impact before, not after, issuance.”172 Ultimately, the court held that a
deferred, case-by-case analysis “defeats this clear purpose.”173
Before the Fourth Circuit ruled on appeal,174 another district court cited
the Ohio Valley district court decision approvingly,175 and many believed
the Fourth Circuit would affirm the district court’s ruling.176 But the
168. 4 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN
WATER ACT OF 1977, at 1053–54 (1978) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CWA].
169. See Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
170. Id.
171. 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CWA, supra note 168, at 349.
172. See Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (emphasis in original).
173. Id.
174. Ohio Valley II, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005).
175. Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 399 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345–47 (M.D. Fla.
2005), vacated by 464 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
176. Joseph Dawley, Unintended Consequences: Clean Air Act’s Acid Rain Program, Mountaintop
Mining and Related Litigation, TRENDS: ABA SEC. OF ENV’T, ENERGY, & RESOURCES NEWSL., Jan.–
Feb. 2005, at 13 (“The practical effect of this ruling, which many believe will be affirmed on appeal,
will be the requirement for individual permits that will trigger environmental review under the
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Fourth Circuit overruled the district court in part, avoiding any discussion
of legislative history.177 Under Chevron step one, the court held that the
CWA “is silent on the question whether the Corps may make its preissuance minimal impact determinations by relying in part on the fact that
its post-issuance procedures will ensure that the authorized projects will
have only minimal impacts.”178 Under step two of Chevron, the Fourth
Circuit found the Army Corps’s partial deferral entirely reasonable, noting
the difficulty of predicting the impact of activities not yet identified.179
Three judges dissented from the Fourth Circuit’s decision to deny
rehearing en banc, arguing that the Corps’s pre-issuance CWA analysis
came up short.180
b.

The Tenth Circuit Relied on the Fourth Circuit’s Ohio Valley
Decision in Holding that the Army Corps May Partially Defer Its
CWA Analysis

A decade after the Ohio Valley cases, both the Tenth Circuit in the GC
Pipeline litigation and the D.C. Circuit in the FS Pipeline litigation cited
the Fourth Circuit’s ruling approvingly.181 However, only the Tenth
Circuit discussed CWA deferral in depth.182 In the GC Pipeline litigation,
the Tenth Circuit explained that partially deferring the CWA analysis is
reasonable, given the difficulty of anticipating impacts from all future
projects that may fall within the scope of a general permit.183 This
difficulty is at its zenith for nationwide permits, the scope of which
includes many projects taking place across the country. 184 For example,
NWP 12 applies to utility lines, which may be used for a multitude of
purposes, such as “carrying resources (like water, fuel, and electricity),
facilitating communication (like telephone lines, internet connections, and

National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act.”).
177. See generally Ohio Valley II, 429 F.3d 493.
178. Id. at 501; see also id. at 500 (“Neither the phrase ‘guarantee ab initio’ nor the phrase ‘initial
certainty’ appears in section 404(e).” (emphasis omitted)).
179. Id. at 501–02.
180. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen, 437 F.3d 421, 422–24 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (King, J.,
dissenting).
181. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1058 (10th Cir.
2015) (“Though we are not bound by [Ohio Valley II], we regard it as persuasive.”).
182. Plaintiffs did not pursue a facial challenge to NWP 12 in the FS Pipeline litigation. Army
Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 22 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Significantly, Plaintiffs have eschewed any facial
challenge to NWP 12 itself.”).
183. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1058.
184. Id.
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cable television), and removing waste.”185 Because of the inherent
difficulty of analyzing the cumulative effects of such a wide variety of
potential projects, the court held that it was reasonable for the Army Corps
to analyze only foreseeable effects at the issuance stage and to defer
unforeseeable aspects to the verification stage. By the verification stage a
proposing party will have specified its project, allowing the Corps to
conduct a more precise analysis.186
2.

Neither the Tenth nor the D.C. Circuits Require the Army Corps to
Conduct Additional NEPA Review at the Verification Stage

According to the Tenth and D.C. Circuits, the Army Corps is not
required to conduct additional NEPA review at the verification stage.187
In fact, requiring additional NEPA review at this later stage is
incompatible with the streamlining nature of general permits.188 Instead,
courts have held that once the Corps issues a nationwide permit in
compliance with NEPA, it has completed the requisite NEPA review; at
the verification stage, the agency simply ensures compliance with the
previously issued, extensively reviewed nationwide permit.189
At least one judge has argued that the Army Corps should conduct
additional NEPA review at the verification stage. During the GC Pipeline
litigation, Judge Martínez argued in a dissenting opinion that, given “the
number of permits issued by the Corps relative to the overall size of the
Gulf Coast Pipeline,” it is “patently ludicrous” to allege that the Corps’s
involvement at the verification stage does not require NEPA review.190
Not only did Judge Martínez’s argument fail to persuade his fellow
judges, his argument also failed to persuade the judges in the FS Pipeline
litigation. There, the court found that the number of verifications per
pipeline makes no difference:
By Plaintiffs’ logic, one construction project that requires 2,000
verifications for water crossings would be subject to further
environmental review under NEPA, while 2,000 separate projects
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1058–63.
187. See id. at 1052–54; Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 49–52 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
188. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2013).
189. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1054 (10th Cir. 2015); Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 27–27.
190. Bostick I, 539 F. App’x 885, 898–99 (10th Cir. 2013) (Martínez, J., dissenting from majority’s
denial of plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction). “The Gulf Coast Pipeline is 485 miles long,
and required the Corps to issue 2,227 permits for water crossings. This means that the Gulf Coast
Pipeline crosses United States waters almost five times in each mile, or about once every 1,150 feet.”
Id. at 899.
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that each require a single verification for a water crossing would
not necessarily require additional review, despite the fact that
both scenarios theoretically pose the same potential threat to the
aquatic environment.191
The concept that the Army Corps does not have to conduct additional
NEPA review at the verification stage appears to have won out. Although
not expressly stated in the Tenth and D.C. Circuit opinions,192 the
conclusion that the Army Corps need not conduct additional NEPA
review during the verification stage implies that the Corps must complete
all NEPA review during the issuance stage.193 Additionally, Judge
McHugh outlined in her concurrence two reasons why the Corps must
complete all NEPA review at the earlier stage.
First, agencies must “complete their environmental analysis at the point
of agency action.”194 NEPA requires an agency to take a “hard look” at an
action’s potential environmental impact before taking the action,195 and
this is impossible if the agency intentionally defers all or a portion of its
analysis.196 In Defenders of Wildlife v. Ballard,197 plaintiffs sued the
Corps, alleging that the agency failed to conduct a cumulative-effects
analysis under NEPA for three nationwide permits.198 The Corps’s stance
was similar to the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning for allowing a partial deferral
of the CWA analysis;199 it argued that it is difficult to predict a nationwide
permit’s potential impact because the impact depends on how often a
nationwide permit is used in a specified geographic area.200 Therefore, the
Corps continued, it is more sensible to conduct a cumulative-effects
analysis under NEPA at a regional level.201 However, the court found that
the analysis was never completed; instead, any additional analysis was
limited to a case-by-case assessment that failed to analyze the cumulative
effects of the nationwide permit, under which thousands of projects could

191. Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 28 n.14.
192. See generally Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 42; Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1047.
193. Cf. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1067 (McHugh, J., concurring) (explaining why the Army Corps
may not defer its NEPA analysis).
194. See id.
195. Id. (citing Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. Krueger, 513 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir.
2008)).
196. Id.
197. 73 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Ariz. 1999).
198. Id. at 1101.
199. See supra section III.A.1.b.
200. Defs. of Wildlife, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1106, 1115 (internal quotations omitted).
201. Id.
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fall.202 Although the Army Corps must assess the cumulative effects of all
projects falling within a general permit’s scope, the court observed that it
was merely analyzing the cumulative effects of individual projects in
isolation.203 While deferral may be helpful to analyze the cumulative
effects of individual projects, it is not helpful to analyze the cumulative
effects of the nationwide permit itself.204 Because the Army Corps must
analyze the latter, the court held deferral improper.205
Similarly, in Wyoming Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, the Corps argued that it deferred its NEPA analysis of a general
permit because “it is impossible to know ‘precisely what specific impacts
might result until a particular project is proposed.’”206 Although the court
acknowledged the inherent difficulty of predicting the cumulative effects
of projects not yet proposed, it held that the difficulty does not excuse the
Corps from analyzing foreseeable problems before issuing a nationwide
permit.207 Like the Defenders of Wildlife court, it rejected the Corps’s
attempt to defer its analysis: “[b]y their very nature, the cumulative
impacts of a general permit cannot be evaluated in the context of approval
of a single project.”208 Once again, a court noted that deferral is not helpful
to analyze the cumulative effects of the nationwide permit itself and found
the Corps’s NEPA analysis deficient.209
Second, Judge McHugh argued that the Corps may not defer its NEPA
analysis because of the strong possibility that the analysis will remain
deferred for good.210 She noted that in many situations where the Corps
defers the NEPA analysis, neither it nor any other agency ever completes
the analysis.211 Largely due to the lack of required federal oversight of oil
pipeline construction—the Army Corps’s jurisdiction is over regulated
waters broadly, not oil pipelines specifically212—domestic oil pipelines
202. Id. at 1112–13.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 1113 (“While Defendants’ scope of analysis may be appropriate for a site-specific
NWP authorization, it is inadequate to measure the impact of implementing the NWP program under
which thousands of projects will be authorized.”).
205. See id.
206. Id. at 1242 (quoting Respondent’s Merits Brief at 39, Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1254 (D. Wyo. 2005) (No. 02-CV-0155-D)).
207. Id. at 1243.
208. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. See id.
210. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1067 (10th Cir. 2015) (McHugh, J., concurring).
211. See id. (“[I]n the context of nationwide permits, it may well be that, as happened here, there
is no lead agency that will conduct an environmental assessment.”).
212. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Because Congress has not authorized
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such as the GC and FS pipelines generally do not have a lead agency. 213
This results in no clear choice of agency to conduct further NEPA
analysis.214 Additionally, nationwide permits often allow activities to
commence without Corps verification.215 If pre-construction notice is not
required, no additional NEPA analysis will ever be considered, and the
deferred analysis will remain deferred for good.216 Thus, the Corps must
“fully evaluate all of the required NEPA factors before reissuing NWP
12.”217
Although Judge McHugh raised concerns over the defects of the Army
Corps’s deferral practice, she ultimately wrote in concurrence rather than
dissent.218 She did so because no commenter objected to the Corps’s
deferral practice during the NEPA notice and comment period—even
though “[t]he Corps has been issuing and reissuing NWP 12 for
decades.”219 Although some issues are “so obvious”220 that a commentator
need not specifically object during notice and comment to preserve the
issue for trial,221 Judge McHugh did not believe the Corps’s deferral
practice was one of those issues.222 Although neither court expressly held
that the Army Corps must complete its NEPA analysis at the issuance
stage, Judge McHugh’s concurrence strongly suggests that the Corps may
not defer.223

the federal government to oversee construction of a domestic oil pipeline, Plaintiffs’ complaint relies
on a series of federal environmental laws and regulations that require federal agencies with some
involvement in domestic pipeline construction to follow certain procedures.”).
213. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1067 (McHugh, J., concurring).
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. (emphasis in original).
218. Id. at 1067–68.
219. Id.
220. The court will usually not hear a plaintiff’s claim if the plaintiff failed to raise the issue during
the NEPA notice-and-comment period; an exception to the rule is when the court deems the issue “so
obvious” that raising the issue during notice and comment was unnecessary. Dep’t of Transp. v. Public
Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 764–65 (2004).
221. Id. at 765. For example, Judge McHugh believed that the Corps’s failure to consider
environmental effects outside the aquatic environment was so obvious that no commenter needed to
raise the argument. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1065 (McHugh, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 1067–68.
223. See id. at 1067. In its 2017 reissuance of NWP 12, the Army Corps stated it does not defer its
NEPA analysis. Issuance and Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 82 Fed. Reg. 1,860, 1,891 (Jan. 6,
2017).
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The Courts Approved the Army Corps’s CWA Analysis While
Strongly Questioning the Agency’s NEPA Analysis

In addition to allowing the Corps to partially defer its CWA analysis,
the Tenth and D.C. Circuits approved the sufficiency of the partially
deferred analysis. The Tenth Circuit held that the Corps’s verification of
the GC Pipeline was not arbitrary or capricious, in part because it could
“reasonably discern that the agency analyzed the cumulative impacts of
the proposed crossings” at the verification stage.224 For example, the court
noted that the agency “prepared verification memoranda that describe the
Corps’[s] analysis of pipeline impacts.”225 The D.C. Circuit reached a
similar conclusion, holding that the Army Corps’s conclusions were
“made at the end of a lengthy memorandum explaining, among other
things, the details concerning the scope of the proposed project in each
respective district, [and] the expected effect of the project on [regulated]
waters.”226
The courts were not as satisfied with the Army Corps’s NEPA analysis,
but neither court ruled on the issue. Judge McHugh explained that, in her
view, the Army Corps’s NEPA analysis was insufficient because it
improperly limited the analysis to the aquatic environment.227 The Tenth
and D.C. Circuits referred to Judge McHugh’s analysis as “thoughtful.”228
However, the Tenth Circuit held the argument waived,229 and the Sierra
Club did not raise the issue in the D.C. Circuit.230

224. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1060–61; see also Army Corps II, 803 F.3d 31, 52–53 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
In the litigation over the GC and FS pipelines, the courts reviewed plaintiffs’ NEPA and CWA
challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012). Army Corps
II, 803 F.3d at 42; Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1047. Under the APA, courts will overturn an agency action
if the action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1047. Generally, a court will uphold an agency’s
action if the agency made a reasonable choice based on the relevant factors and alternatives. Bostick
II, 787 F.3d at 1047 (citing Mt. Evans Co. v. Madigan, 14 F.3d 1444, 1453 (10th Cir. 1994)).
225. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1061. The court rejected the environmental groups’ argument that the
memoranda were deficient, deferring to the trial court’s holding that the groups waived the argument
by failing to properly raise it. Id. at 1061 n.19.
226. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 52–53 (citing Sierra Club, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 64
F. Supp. 3d 128, 157 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 803 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
227. See supra section I.C.
228. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 40 n.3; Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1051 n.8.
229. Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1051 n.8.
230. Army Corps II, 803 F.3d at 39–40.
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IV. COURTS SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE ARMY CORPS TO
DEFER ANY OF ITS ANALYSIS
The Tenth and D.C. Circuits have so far upheld the use of NWP 12 as
a tool for approving domestic oil pipelines,231 and their decisions have
shed light on the Corps’s separate but related CWA and NEPA
analyses.232 The Tenth Circuit followed Fourth Circuit precedent allowing
a partially deferred CWA analysis under Chevron deference.233 Despite
the Tenth Circuit’s opinion, partially deferring the CWA analysis violates
the CWA’s text, structure, purpose, and legislative history, which reveals
that the Army Corps must complete all analysis before issuing a permit.
Moreover, deferral unacceptably allows the Corps to avoid the combined
effect of NEPA and the CWA, limiting the public’s ability to comment.
Therefore, Army Corps regulations allowing partial deferral fail under
Chevron step one. Courts should reject recent precedent and reconcile
general permitting with the CWA’s plain meaning.
A.

The CWA Is Clear: The Army Corps May Not Defer Its Analysis

The Army Corps must approve projects falling within the scope of a
general permit without additional review. The CWA’s objective “is to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters.”234 Under the CWA’s plain language, the agency may
not issue a general permit unless it can show that the permit’s cumulative
adverse effect on regulated waters will be minimal.235 If the Army Corps
can show that the permit will have a minimal adverse effect, it may issue
the permit, and all projects falling within the permit’s scope may proceed
without further analysis.236 Because the agency must show minimal
effects at the issuance stage,237 additional analysis at the verification stage
is unnecessary. In other words, if the Army Corps satisfies its CWA

231. See id. at 33–35; Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1061.
232. See supra section I.C.
233. See supra section III.A.1.b.
234. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
235. Id. § 1344(e)(1) (“Secretary may . . . issue general permits . . . for any category of
activities . . . if the Secretary determines that the activities in such category are similar in nature, will
cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have only
minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.”); see also Julia Fuschino, Note, Mountaintop
Coal Mining and the Clean Water Act: The Fight Over Nationwide Permit 21, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 179, 203–05 (2007); supra text accompanying notes 33–35.
236. See supra section I.A.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35.
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responsibility by properly analyzing the permit’s potential effects at the
issuance stage, it will not have any analysis left to complete at the
verification stage. If the Army Corps cannot satisfy the CWA’s generalpermitting requirements, it is not out of options. The same section of the
CWA providing for general permitting also provides for individual
permitting.238 Thus, the CWA directly speaks against deferral. If the Army
Corps cannot satisfy the CWA’s general-permitting provisions at the
issuance stage, the answer is not deferral; rather, it must proceed with
permitting on an individual basis.
Additionally, the circumstances in which Congress created the generalpermitting option suggest that it intended general permitting to obviate
potentially burdensome individual review only for small projects.239
Before general permits, the Army Corps expressed concern over having
to individually permit too many projects. After the Callaway court
broadly defined the Corps’s jurisdiction,240 the agency argued the decision
would require it to issue an individual permit to, for example, a rancher
hoping to enlarge her stock pond, a farmer desiring to deepen his irrigation
ditch or plow a field, or a mountaineer wanting to protect her land from
stream erosion.241 Noticeably absent from this list is the oil tycoon hoping
to profit from a massive, interstate pipeline that will cross thousands of
regulated waters. The concern was that the Army Corps’s broad
jurisdiction required individual permitting of small projects, which the
agency viewed as an unnecessary waste of time. In creating a generalpermitting alternative, Congress sought to alleviate some of the Corps’s
concerns.242
Finally, the legislative history of general permitting suggests that the
Army Corps may not defer its CWA analysis. Senator Muskie, influential
in the legislation adding the general permitting option to the CWA,
confirmed that once issued, general permits do not require the Army
Corps to separately approve each project falling within the permit’s
scope.243 Representative Roberts, also influential in the legislation adding
the general permitting option to the CWA, added that requiring the Army
Corps to approve each separate project “would be unreasonable” and

238. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (e).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 36–45.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 36–43.
241. Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 454 (S.D.W. Va. 2004) (citing Blumm & Zaleha, supra
note 37, at 705 n.56), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005).
242. Id. at 454–55.
243. 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CWA, supra note 168, at 1053–54.
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“would defeat the purpose of general permits.”244 The district court in
Ohio Valley relied in part on this legislative history in holding that the
Army Corps may not defer its CWA analysis.245 The Fourth Circuit
reversed, but it did not mention any legislative history in its opinion.246
Instead, the circuit court held that the CWA permits deferral, noting the
difficulty of predicting the environmental impact of yet-to-be-identified
projects.247 The court also noted that the CWA does not explicitly prohibit
the Army Corps from relying on a to-be-completed analysis at the
issuance stage.248 However, as just articulated, the CWA does explicitly
prohibit deferral.249 Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit relied on the Fourth
Circuit’s holding in conducting its own Chevron analysis,250 similarly
failing to examine the legislative history.251
In sum, any review beyond a simple verification—a mere affirmation
that the project falls within the general permit’s scope—violates the
streamlining nature of the permits and blurs the line between general and
individual permits. By allowing the Corps to defer a general permit’s
unforeseeable effects to the verification stage,252 courts are allowing more
than a simple verification. They are allowing the Army Corps to analyze
and then verify. However, the CWA sets a high bar: prior to issuance, the
Corps must prove that the permit will result in minimal adverse
environmental effects, both individually and cumulatively.253 If it cannot
prove minimal adverse effects, it may not issue the general permit.
Without a general permit, the Army Corps must individually permit
proposed projects such as oil pipelines—requiring whole-project
environmental review.
B.

The CWA Must Remain Coupled with Its NEPA Counterpart to
Provide the Public with an Opportunity to Comment
NEPA provides the public with an opportunity to comment on

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 349.
Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
See generally Ohio Valley II, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 501.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 235–23838.
Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1058 (10th Cir. 2015).
See generally id.
Bostick II, 787 F.3d at 1058–60.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2012).
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proposed projects.254 When permitting an individual project, the Army
Corps has no opportunity to defer either its CWA or NEPA analysis to a
verification stage, as there is no verification stage. Thus, the CWA and
NEPA necessarily work together, providing the public an opportunity to
comment before the Army Corps may grant the permit. Public comment
is critical; NEPA’s requirement for a public comment period reflects its
importance. Public comment ensures “that the larger audience . . . can
provide input as necessary to the agency making the relevant
decisions,”255 and it assists the federal government in making informed
decisions.256 General permits inappropriately change the calculus by
limiting the opportunity for public comment to the issuance stage—
despite additional review taking place at the verification stage.
Courts have allowed the Army Corps to partially defer its CWA
analysis of general permits to the verification stage257 while not requiring
additional NEPA review.258 The Army Corps’s issuance of a general
permit is a major federal action, triggering NEPA.259 However, NEPA
review is absent from the deferred portion of the Corps’s CWA analysis.
This effectively limits public comment to the issuance stage, at which time
entities have yet to specify any projects. In other words, the public is left
to comment on unspecified, abstract projects. It also creates an
inappropriate double standard. On one hand, courts allow a deferred CWA
analysis because of the inherent difficulty of predicting future projects at
the issuance stage.260 On the other, courts limit the public’s ability to
comment to this same, abstract stage. This impediment to public comment
is one reason the district court in Ohio Valley found CWA deferral
inappropriate;261 the court observed that CWA deferral “eliminates public
involvement in decision-making at a stage where meaningful input in the
minimal impact determination is possible.”262
To appropriately give effect to NEPA’s public-comment requirement,
254. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012); Army Corps I, 990 F.
Supp. 2d 9, 18 (D.D.C. 2013).
255. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768–69 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).
256. See id.
257. See supra section III.A.1.
258. See supra section III.A.2.
259. See Army Corps I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 19, 21.
260. See Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1058–60 (10th Cir. 2015). Moreover, Judge McHugh
persuasively argued that the Corps must complete its NEPA analysis at the issuance stage. See supra
section III.A.2.
261. Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 468 (S.D.W. Va. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 429
F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005).
262. Id.
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the Army Corps must tether all CWA analysis to NEPA analysis.
Untethering the two analyses is incompatible with NEPA’s publiccomment mandate. The Corps has two options: (1) conduct NEPA review
at the verification stage, or (2) stop partially deferring its CWA analysis.
The first option cannot be squared with recent judicial precedent,263 nor
can it be squared with the CWA’s streamlining nature.264 Thus, to provide
adequate opportunity for public comment, the Army Corps must complete
its entire CWA and NEPA analyses at the issuance stage. If it is
impossible to do so, the agency must turn to individual permitting.
C.

Courts Should Not Excuse Compliance with the CWA Simply
Because Compliance Is Difficult

The Fourth and Tenth Circuits’ reasoning for allowing partial CWA
deferral—the “inherent difficulty” of predicting future projects—cannot
overcome the CWA’s plain language. Moreover, the reasoning is at odds
with other courts’ reasoning for disallowing NEPA deferral. For example,
in Defenders of Wildlife and Wyoming Outdoor Council, the courts
observed that while a deferred NEPA analysis would provide the Army
Corps an opportunity to scrutinize an individual project’s cumulative
effects, NEPA demands an analysis of the general permit’s cumulative
effects.265 For example, if the Army Corps estimated that it would use
NWP 12 to approve ten oil pipelines, it must analyze the cumulative
effects of all ten before issuing the permit. Waiting for an oil company to
propose one specific pipeline may make a cumulative effects analysis
easier for that one pipeline. But it will not ease the Army Corps’s burden
of analyzing the cumulative effects of all ten. “By their very nature, the
‘cumulative impacts’ of a general permit cannot be evaluated in the
context of approval of a single project.”266
The same can be said of the Army Corps’s CWA analysis. The agency
must ensure that the cumulative effects of all projects within the permit’s
scope will minimally impact the environment. Conducting this analysis
piece-by-piece in the context of individual projects is difficult—maybe
impossible. Judge McHugh acknowledged that “accounting in advance
for the broad range of possible impacts resulting from the wide variety of

263.
264.
265.
266.
2005).

See supra section III.A.2.
See supra section IV.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 194–209.
Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1243 (D. Wyo.
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utility lines authorized under NWP 12 is a daunting task.”267 But she also
noted that “compliance with NEPA is not excused simply because
compliance is difficult.”268 The same could—indeed, should—be said for
compliance with the CWA.
The strong circuit precedent creates a substantial hurdle for
environmental groups to overcome when arguing that deferral violates the
CWA, but the groups should nevertheless challenge the Army Corps’s
deferred CWA analysis. The groups should do so by challenging prior
courts’ application of Chevron. As the window to prevent climate
change’s worst effects closes,269 environmentalists must seek to revive the
Ohio Valley district court’s analysis, which properly construes the CWA
and leads to acceptable results based on sound reasoning.
V.

REISSUANCE OF NWP 12: THE ARMY CORPS ADDRESSES
MANY, BUT NOT ALL, PROBLEMS

The 2012 version of NWP 12 was set to expire on March 18, 2017,270
as general permits expire every five years.271 However, on January 6,
2017, the Army Corps reissued NWP 12 for another five years.272 As
required, the agency conducted CWA and NEPA review before reissuing
the general permit.273 NEPA review provided environmental groups an
opportunity to comment on the reissuance.
Armed with Judge McHugh’s concurrence, the groups commented that
the Army Corps’s NEPA review was inadequate.274 However, the agency
analyzed the cumulative effects of oil pipelines275 and did not limit its
267. Bostick II, 787 F.3d 1043, 1066 (10th Cir. 2015) (McHugh, J., concurring).
268. Id.
269. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
270. Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,184 (Feb. 21, 2012).
271. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(2) (2012).
272. Issuance and Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 82 Fed. Reg. 1,860, 1,860 (Jan. 6, 2017). The
Trump administration exempted these permits from its early-2017 regulatory freeze. Justin Worland,
President Trump Kept This One Obama Regulation Because It Makes Approving Pipelines Easier,
TIME (Feb. 9, 2017), http://time.com/4665432/nationwide-permits-dakota-access-pipeline/
[http://perma.cc/9QQT-Z269]. For more information on the regulatory freeze, see Memorandum from
Reince Priebus, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies
(Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/20/memorandum-headsexecutive-departments-and-agencies [http://perma.cc/6ASY-TRCL].
273. See supra section I.C.
274. NWP 12: Public Comments, supra note 112, at 19, 82–96.
275. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DECISION DOCUMENT: NATIONWIDE PERMIT 12, at 23 (2016)
[hereinafter DECISION DOCUMENT 2016], http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/
nwp/2017/NWP_12_2017_final_Dec2016.pdf?ver=2017-01-06-125514-797 [http://perma.cc/TU54MLBC]. Its analysis assumed the agency would use NWP 12 “approximately 11,500 times per year
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NEPA analysis to the aquatic environment, which it had done during the
2012 reissuance.276 The Corps likely made this change because it was
aware of Judge McHugh’s concurrence and the strong language from both
the Tenth and D.C. Circuits calling its previous analysis into question.277
These changes are a step in the right direction and likely preclude
challenges based on the adequacy of the Army Corps’s NEPA analysis.
However, the Army Corps’s changes did not preclude all potential
challenges. Namely, environmental groups also brought attention to the
improper deferral of CWA analysis during public comment on the
reissuance of NWP 12278 and further argued that NEPA requires the Army
Corps to provide opportunity for public comment during the verification
stage of specific pipelines.279 The 2017 reissuance still allows the Corps
to partially defer its CWA analysis. Specifically, the 2017 reissuance
retained the requirement for pre-construction notice in specified situations
because notice has “been effective in identifying proposed NWP 12
activities that should be reviewed by district engineers on a case-by-case
basis to ensure that they result in only minimal individual and cumulative
adverse environmental effects.”280 Thus, the argument remains valid that
the Army Corps should not review individual projects that fall within the
scope of NWP 12 on a case-by-case basis.281 Instead, its CWA and NEPA
analyses must be completed at the issuance stage.282 Environmental
groups should challenge the next oil pipeline approved through the use of
NWP 12.
CONCLUSION
Environmental groups should challenge the current case law supporting
the Army Corps’s use of NWP 12 to approve domestic oil pipelines.
Although the Army Corps recently strengthened its analysis of NWP 12
to avoid future liability, the use of the general permit to approve domestic
oil pipelines remains vulnerable to challenge in court. Specifically,
on a national basis, resulting in impacts to approximately 1,700 acres of waters.” Id. at 70.
276. Compare U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DECISION DOCUMENT: NATIONWIDE PERMIT 12, at
23–28 (2012), http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/nwp/2012/NWP_12_2012.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZHH8-ZURS] (limiting analysis to the aquatic environment), with DECISION
DOCUMENT 2016, supra note 275, at 44–56 (2016) (broadening analysis to more than the aquatic
environment).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 227–30.
278. NWP 12: Public Comments, supra note 112, at 19, 15–20.
279. Issuance and Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 82 Fed. Reg. 1860, 1884 (Jan. 6, 2017).
280. Id. at 1888.
281. See supra Part IV.
282. See supra Part IV.
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environmentalists should urge courts to conduct a new Chevron analysis
of CWA deferral without relying on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Ohio
Valley. The CWA is clear: the Army Corps may not partially defer its
analysis of cumulative effects; instead, it must complete the analysis,
along with its NEPA analysis, before issuing a general permit. Allowing
deferral ignores the CWA’s plain meaning and inappropriately limits the
public’s ability to comment as required by NEPA. If the Army Corps
cannot prove minimal cumulative effects at the issuance stage, it may not
issue a general permit and must individually permit projects instead.
Judicial recognition of this argument will bring environmental review of
oil pipelines into compliance with the CWA, strengthening review and
improving the public’s ability to comment—a major win in the battle for
a cleaner environment.

